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[L. A. No. 23492. In Bank. Oct. 7, 1955.J

DOROTHY BUCKLEY et al., Appellants, v. FRED D.
CHADWICK, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Oase.-Where
imputed negligence was not pleaded as a defense in a wrongful
death action but the case was tried on the theory that the
pleading was sufficient in this respect, and where plaintiffs
made no objection to evidence relating to negligence of agents
of the deceased, plaintiffs will be deemed to have waived the
alleged pleading defect.
[2] Id.-Record-Review as Affected by Oontents of Record.-In
an action against an owner of a crane for wrongful death
which occurred when the boom cable of the crane which deceased and his partner had rented broke, plaintiffs could not

McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 132; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 471; [3] Negligence, § 150; [4] Joint Adventurers, § 5;
[5] Partnership, § 50; [6,7] Negligence, § 33; [8,12,13,15] Death,
§39; [9,11] Death,§13; [10] Statutes, §191; [14] Statutes, §185;
[16] Courts, §85; [171 Jury, § li3; (18) Appeal and Error,
§ 1524-1.
•

•

I

•.

'., I

J

I

,

"

,. I

I"

"

••• ,

:.

184

•

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

BUCKLEY V. CHADWICK

[45 C.2d

successfully urge that there was no evidence that the oiler on
the crane was an agent or elllploye of the partnership or of deccnned where, in addition to the rental contract provision that
the partnership furnish an experienced oiler in operation of
the crane, the settled statement prepared by plaintiffs recited
that, at the time of the accident, such crane was being operated
by the partnership through deceased's partner and such oiler,
where deceased's partner testified that he had an oiler on the
job, where the trial judge stated in his opinion denying plaintills' motion for new trial that the case was tried on the
assumption that such agency existed, and whore plaintiffs on
appeal failed to point out or provide a record of any evidence
which would support a finding that the oiler was other than
an employe or agent of the partnership.
Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact-Scope of Employment.-In an action against an owner of a crane for wrongful
death which occurred when the boom cable of the crane which
deceased and his partner had rented broke, where the settled.
statement and testimony given by such partner established that
any negligence of partner or an oiler in operation of the
crane was in the scope of their employment on behalf of the
partnership, there was no error in not SUbmitting to the jury
the issue of scope of employment.
Joint Adventurers-Liability to Third Persons.-The negligenCQ of one joint venturer or of his employe acting in connection with the joint venture is imputed to the other joint
venturers.
Partnership-Relation With Third Persons-Liability for Tort..
-Any negligence of a partner or an agent of the partnership
is imputed to another partner.
Negligence-Contributory Negligence.-The defense of contributory negligence is not of statutory creation.
ld.-Contributory Negligence.-It is the rule of the civil and
of the common law that one who by his own negligence has
brought an injury on himself cannot recover damages for it.
Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory
Negligence.-If Civ. Code, § 1714, relating to responsibility for
willful acts and negligence, be taken as generally definitive of
contributory negligence, there is nothing in it which precludes
application in wrongful death cases.
ld.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Construction of Code Pro-

[5] See Cal.Jur., Partnership, § 66; Am.Jur., Partnership, § 190

et seq.
[6] See CalJur.. Negligence,
1174 it ~
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visions.-The cause of action created by the wrongful death
statute is not for the injured person but is for his heirs or
next of kin to compensate fo&r their pecuniary loss resulting
from their economic relationship to, and the wrongful death
of, the injured person, and hence plaintiffs are not persons
injured as contemplated by Civ. Code, § 1714, but are persons
who have suifered consequential damage ensuing from the
death of the person injured.
[10] Statutes-Construction of Codes.-The language of Civ. Code,
§ 1714, relating to responsibility for willful acts and negligence,
is substantially the same as the general rule of the common
law, and hence is to be construed as a continuation thereof,
not as a new enactment. (Civ. Code, § 5.)
[l1a, lIb] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Construction of
Statute.-Inasmuch as the substance of Lord Campbell's Act,
relating to compensating families of persons killed by accidents, was adopted in California without qualifying applicatory
rules, it is to be presumed that the Legislature acted in the
light of the contemporary construction of that act, together
with the rules which were being applied to actions on it and
defenses thereto.
[12] Id.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory
Negligence.-Contributory negligence of the decedent as a
defense in wrongful death actions is as old as Lord Campbell's
Act, and it is presumed that the adoption of the substance
of such statute in California was with knowledge of the
English decisions pertinent to application of the law.
[13] Id.-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory
Negligence.-Whether the origin of the contributory negligence
rule in wrongful death cases is viewed as being sound in law
and reason or as being questionable in both, the rule itself has
emerged as progenerate in its own right.
[14] Statutes-Presumptions-Legislative Knowledge.-In adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted
and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have
a direct bearing on them.
[15] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Defenses-Contributory Negligence.-The rule is established in this state that in
wrongful death actions contributory negligence on the part
of the deceased is defensive matter and, when shown, will bar
recovery.
[16] Courts-Rules of Practice and Procedure.-The broad power
of a judge to control the proceedings before him does not go
80

fa.r
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to warrant an euctioll contrary to law.
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[l7J Jury-Peremptory Challenges.-The right to challenge a
certain number of jurors peremptorily is absolute under the
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 601), and the fact that a party
has ouce passed the jury, including the juror afterward sought
to be challenged, does not cut off this right.
[I'n] Appsal-llarmless En-or-Jury.-WherE' the record shows
that a peremptory challenge was taken and erroneously disallowed as to one juror only, and that the jurors were unani- .
mous in their verdict, and appellant has made no affirmative
showing that any of the Jurors who were actually ~jworn and
served in the trial of the cause were biased, prejudiced or
unfit to scrv~ as trial jurors, and where it docs not appear that
by reason of the manner in which the jury was selected the
app~llant did not have a fair and impartial trial or, in the
light of the entire record, that error in the selection of
the ,jurors resulted in a miscarriage of justice, such error furnishes no ground for reversal of the judgment. (Const.,
art. VI, § 4%.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Allen 'V. Ashburn, JUdge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death.
defendant affirmed.

Judgment for

Russell H. Pray, Block & Dunbar, Samuel P. Block and
Eric A. Rose for Appellants.
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and William C. Wetherbee
for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-In this wrongful death action plaintiffs, the
surviving widow and minor son of Allen Buckley, deceased,
appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict. During the trial the widow waived in favor of the son
her rights to the proceeds of any recovery. We have concluded that plaintiffs' various contentions furnish insufficient
grounds for reversal, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
The record on appeal consists of a clerk's transcript. and
a settled statement, prepared by plaintiffs, of oral proceedings
at the trial. (See rule 7, Rules on Appeal, 36 Ca1.2d 8.) The
statement comprises in part a narration of numerous facta
[17] Peremptory challenge after acceptance of juror, note, 3

A.L.B..2d 499. See also Cal.Jur. Jury, § 107; Am.Jur., Jury, § 19L
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and in part verbatim extracts "from a partial reporter's
transcript of oral proceedings." From sl!ch statement it
appears that the decedent, Allell Buckley, was in the business
of contracting for the furnisl1ing of dirt and other materials
on construction jobs. He owned two dump trucks and rented
. at various times cranes and other equipment necessary in
his business. On March 16, 1951, he and one McDonald entered into a partnership with each other to furnish certain
dirt on a construction site for a third party and agreed to
equal division of the profits. On the same day the two partners rented from defendant, also in the contracting business,
a drag line crane, without an operator and on a "bare rental
basis. U The lease contract, which was oral, "provided that
said partnership provide an experienced oiler in the operation
of the crane and also that Mr. McDonald would operate it."
Defendant stated at that time that the crane was in first class
condition and had been worked on since it came off the last
job. McDonald transported the crane to a dirt pit where
the partnership used it for the loading of dump trucks.
On April 19, 1951, while McDonald was operating the crane
to deposit dirt in a dump truck, the boom cable of the crane
broke and the boom fell, striking and killing Buckley, who
was standing on the running board of the truck. The one-half
inch boom cable broke inside the cab of the drag line crane
at a place on the cable that was rolled on, around, and off the
drum as the boom was raised and lowered in operation.
The evidence conflicts sharply concerning what caused the
cable to break. The settled statement recites that "At the
time of the accident said crane was being operated and maintained by said partnership through Mr. McDonald and said
oiler" provided by the partnership. There was expert testimony that at the point of break the cable had been worn and
defective for some time and was "worn out a long time ago,"
and that such condition could not have developed during the
period the partnership had used the crane. Conflicting evi.
dence was that defendant Chadwick and his mechanic had
inspected the cable closely before renting. it out to the part.
nership and that it was then in good condition. McDonald
testified that it was the oiler's duty to "oil the machine"
but it was not his duty to inspect the cable and that ,if a
strand of the cable "is broken in view, either I or the oiler
would have caught it," while defendant's expert witnesses

stated that the 9iler should have

inspecte~

the eable every

)

)

)
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day alld oiled it at intervals, and, further, that "the ends
of t he broken cable .•• where the break occurred showed
abrasive damage resulting from faulty winding and unwinding" of the cable and that "if McDonald and the oiler had
allowed the cable to cross-wind or overlap on the drum during
tlie six days they were using the crane, enough damage could
have been done in one second of use under strain to have
caused the cable to break."
Plaintiffs' complaint is framed in two counts, one for an
alleged breach of warranty and the other for alleged negligence of defendant crane owner. Defendant answered with
a general denial, and also pleaded contributory negligence of
the deceased, and unavoidable accident. As grounds requiring
reversal of the judgment in defendant's favor plaintiffs urge
error in jury instructions, and also that the court erroneously
prevented the exercise of peremptory challenges by plaintiffs
in the selection of the jury.
The court instructed the jury that negligence on the part
of the deceased Buckley or of his agent which proximately
contributed to the death would bar recovery against defendant, that the evidence established that the crane was being
operated and maintained by agents of the deceased, that
McDonald was such an agent, that if the jury found "that
there was any negligence 011 the part of one or both of Buckley's agents, McDonald and the oiler, which contributed in
any degree as a proximate cause of the accident," then plaintiffs could not recover, and that the "reason for the rule is
that the negligence of an agent within the course and scope
of his employment is imputed to his principal."
[1] In reliance upon Campagna v. Market St. By. Co.
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 304, 307 [149 P.2d 281] (see also Bennetf
v. Cltanslor &- Lyon Co. (1928), 204 Cal. 101, 105 [266 P.
803] ; Bencich v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1937), 20 Cal.App.2d
518, 526 [67 P.2d 398]), plaintiffs first contend that the instructions as to imputed negligence were erroneous because
such defense was not pleaded in defendant's answer and therefore was not in issue. Plaintiffs first raised the point, however,
on their motion for new trial, and the case was tried throughout upon the theory that the pleading was sufficient in this
respect. Further, the record on appeal discloses no objection
by plaintiffs to evidence relating to negligence of agents of the
deceased. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs will be deemed
to have waived the alleged pleading defect. (See Miller v.
Peter, (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 89, 93 [230 P.2d 8031; Vaughn v.

-~
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Jonas (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 586, 605 [191 P.2d 432]; Hinkle
v. Southern Pac. 00. (1939), 12 Ca1.2d 691, 701 [87 P.2d
349]; Swink v. Gardena Olub" (1944), 65 Cal.App.2d 674,
680-681 [151 P.2d 313]; Simpson v. Bergmann (1932), 125
Cal.App. 1, 5-6 [13 P.2d 531] ; Resetar v. Leonardi (1923),
61 Cal.App. 765, 767 [216 P. 71].)
[2] Plaintiffs also urge that there was no evidence that the
oiler was an agent, servant or employe of the partnership
or of the deceased. In addition to the rental contract provision that the partnership furnish an experienced oiler in
the operation of the crane, the settled statement prepared by
plaintiffs recites as indicated above that "At the time of the
accident said crane was being operated and maintained by
said partnership through Mr. McDonald and said oiler."
McDonald, as a witness for plaintiff, testified, "Q. Did you
have someone else working there' A. I had an oiler. Q. And
was he on the job as long as you were on the job' A. Yes."
Also, the trial judge in his memorandum opinion upon denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial (which opinion is included in the settled statement) wrote that "the case was
tried and argued upon the assumption that such agency
existed," and that counsel for plaintiffs, when requested on
oral argument to indicate "evidence pointing to any inference other than the agency of the oiler . • • could point to
none. " Plaintiffs do not claim such statements of the trial
judge are incorrect, and on appeal have failed to point
out or provide a record of any evidence which would support
a finding that the oiler was other than an employe or agent
of the partnership. Their contention on this point thus provides no ground for reversal. (See Brokaw v. Black-Foze
Military Institute (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [231 P.2d 816] ;
Philbrook v. Randall (1924), 195 Cal. 95, 104 [231 P. 739] ;
Bacon v. Grosse (1913), 165 Cal. 481, 490 [132 P. 1027];
Cutting Fruit Packing 00. v. Oanty (1904), 141 Cal. 692,
695-696 [75 P. 564] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d 426, § 559, and cases there
cited.) [3] The quoted statements and testimony also establish that any negligence by McDonald or the oiler in operation of the crane was in the scope of their employment on
behalf of the partnership; thus no error is shown in not
submitting to the jury the issue of scope of employmeJlt.
Plaintiffs next urge that any negligence of an agent of the
deceased is not imputable to an heir in a wrongful death
BCUOD.
The court, however, instructed the jury that if

)

)

)
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negligence on the part of the deceased or of his agent proximately contributed to the death, then recovery was barred.
[4] Very recently, after first pointing out the general principle that "The relationship of joint venturers is that of a
m.utual agency, akin to a limited partnership," we held that
"the negligence of one joint venturer or of his employes
acting in connection with the joint venture is imputed to the
other joint venturers." (Leming v. Oilfields Trucking 00.
(1955), 44 Ca1.2d 343, 350 [282 P.2d 23].) [5] Applying
the same rule here, it follows that any negligence of the
partner McDonald or the oiler, an agent of the partnership,
would be imputed to Buckley.
Plaintiffs also contend, in reliance upon a challenging article
appearing in 42 California Law Review 310, authored by
the learned Judge Paul Nourse of the Los Angeles Superior
Court, that in any event contributory negligence (whether
of the deceased, or imputed to him) is not a defense in a
wrongful death action. Meeting the challenge, defendant
urges, is the opinion of the equally learned trial judge delivered upon denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in
this case, holding that the law is definitely settled to the
contrary. Since the origin, development and acceptance of
the rule recognizing contributory negligence of the decedent
as a defense in wrongful death actions has not heretofore been
extensively explored by this court, we give it our attention.
Before 1862 there was no wrongful death action in this
state. (Kramer v. San Francisco Market Street R. Co. (1864),
25 Ca1. 434, 435.) In that year the Legislature, following
the philosophy of Lord Campbell's Act, l and to a substantial
1Lord Campbell's Act: "An Act; for compensating the Families of
Persons killed by Accidents.
[26th August 1846.]
"WHEREAS no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person
who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death
of another Person, and it is oftentimes right and expedient that the
Wrongdoer in such Case should be answerable in Damages for the Inju17
so caused by him: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent
Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by
the Authority of the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person shall
be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or
Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the
Party injured to maintain an action and recover Damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who would have been
liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages,
notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the
Death shall hav~ been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law
W Felony.
u U. And be it eaacted, ThAt Qveq such AC;tioJL shall be fo~ the bGd*

)
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extent its phraseology, created such a cause of action. (Stats.
1862, p. 447.) Like Lord Campbell's Act (set out in material
part in the margin), it provided (in section 1) that "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default, is such
as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then, •.• the person who ... would have been liable
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . ."
In the interest of accuracy, and to dispel a misconception which has found its way into some writings, hereinafter mentioned in more detail, it should be noted that the
quoted language of section 1 (which is almost identical with
the language of the original Lord Campbell's Act) does not
expressly make the right to recover dependent on the absence
of contributory negligence on the part of the decedent. Such
language (and the same may be said of Lord Campbell's Act)
indicates no design by the Legislature to state a rule either
of requirement that plaintiff show as a part of his case that
the decedent was free of contributory negligence, or that
contributory negligence of the decedent should or should not
be available as a defense. It makes no reference whatsoever
to the conduct of the injured person (the decedent) or to
his ultimate right to recover if he had survived. In terms it
requires only that "the act, neglect, or default" of the tortfeasor be such as would "have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof."
Obviously, it does not state that the conduct of "the party
of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall
have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the
Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every such
Action the Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned
to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively for
whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought; and the
Amount so recovered, after deducting the Costs not recovered from the
Defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned Parties ill
Buch Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall find and direct.
"III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One
Action shall lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of Com·
plaint, and that every such Action shall be commenced within Twelve
Calendar Months after the Death of such deceased Person.
"IV. And be it enacted, That in every such Action the Plaintiff 011 the
Record shall be required, together with tIle Declaration, to deliver to the
Defendant or his Attorney a full Particular of the Person or Persons for
whom and on whose Behalf such Action shall be brought, and of the
Nature of the Claim in respect of which Damages shall be Souiht to be
recovered. • •• " .f,.9 & 10 Viet., ch. 93, pp. 531·532.)
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injured" must have been free from contributory negligence
or that such negligence on his part should or should not COllstitute a defense to the cause of action created. Thus the
Legislature did not negate its ordinarily to be presumed acceptance of the contemporary construction by the courts of
the similar language in Lord Campbell's Act, hereinafter
discussed, but left the courts of this state free to interpret
and apply the statute in the light of the common law as it
might appear in this field.
[6] Another misconception appears to be that section 1714
of the Civil Code creates, and by its language limits, the
defense of contributory negligence. (See 42 Cal.L.Rev. 312.)
But the defense of contributory negligence is not of statutory
creation. [7] As was stated by the United States Supreme
Court at least as long ago as 1877, "One who by his negligence has brought an injury upon himself cannot recover
damages for it. Such is the rule of the civil and of the
common law." (Baltimore w P. R. Co. v. Jones (1877), 95
U.S. 439, 442 [24 L.Ed. 506).) [8] But even if we take
section 1714 as generally definitive of contributory negligence
in California, we find nothing in it which precludes application in wrongful death cases. The section reads: "Everyone
is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to anotht:r by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person,
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary
care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability
in such cases is defined by the title on compensatory relief."
[9] Clearly, the "injury occasioned to another" which is
spoken of in section 1714 is the injury to the person who is
the victim of the actor's negligence. As pertinent in a wrongful death case, the "injury occasioned to another" has caused
the death of the victim; the cause of action created by the
wrongful death statute is not for the injured person but is
for his heirs or next of kin to compensate for their pecuniary
loss resulting from their economic relationship to, and the
wrongful death of, the injured person. The plaintiffs are
not persons injured as contemplated by the statute; they
are persons who have suffered consequential damage ensuing
from the death of the person injured. Thus section 1714,
like the wrongful death statute, is completely silent on the
question of contributory negligence as a defense to actions
brought under the latter act. [10] Insofar as the language
of section 1714 is cOllcel'lled it is substantially the same as

Oct. 1955]
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the general rule of the common law and, hence, is to be
construed as a continuation thereof, not as a new enactment.
(Civ. Code, § 5.)
[lla] However, it can be urged, and properly so, that since
the substance of Lord Campbell's Act was adopted in California without qualifying applicatory rules it is to be strongly
presumed that the Legislature acted in the light of the contemporary construction of that act (see 50 Am.Jur. 309-311,
§ 319), together with the rules which were being applied to
actions upon it and defenses thereto (see Holmes v. McOolgan
(1941), 17 Ca1.2d 426, 430 [110 P.2d 428] ; Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935), 2 Ca1.2d 727, 735 [43 P.2d 291,
98 A.L.R. 1499]; Estate of Potter (1922), 188 Cal. 55, 68
[204 P. 826]). [12] In respect to contributory negligence
of the decedent as a defense in such actions there can be no
doubt that the rule is as old as the act. Lord Campbell's Act
was enacted in 1846. In 1849 the Court of Common Pleas
had before it several cases in which negligence and contributory negligence were issues and in one of which ('l'horogood
v. Bryan (1849), 8 C.B. 115, 65 E.C.L. 115, 137 English Reprint 452 (Common Pleas Book 15» the action was based
on Lord Campbell's Act. The report of the case relates, "The
first of these was an action upon the case brought by the
plaintiff Sarah Thorogood, as administratrix of her late husband . . . under the statute 10 Vic. c. 93, to recover damages
against the defendant for negligently causing the intestate'8
death
[Po 453.] The learned judge told the jury, that,
if they were of opinion that • • • want of care on the part
of the driver of Barber's [deceased's] omnibus in not drawing
up to the kerb to put the deceased down, or any want of care
on the part of the deceased himself, had been conducive to
the injury, in either of thosecases,-notwithstanding the defendant (by her servant) had been guilty of negligence, their
verdict must be for the defendant." It was held that the
instruction properly stated the law and the judgment for
defendant was affirmed.
Some 10 years later (in Senior v. Ward (1859), 1 E. & E.
385, 102 E.C.L. 385, 120 English Reprint (King's Bench,
Book 49) 954) we find Lord Campbell, himself, as Chief
Justice, speaking for the Queen's Bench and declaring the
law applicable to an action upon the statute in question. "The
report tells us: (P. 954.) "At the trial, before Cockburn
C.J 0, at the last Summer ~es for Derbyshire, it appeared
.&

0

•

0
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that the aetion was brought, under stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93,
by the plaintiff, a widow, to recover damages for the death
of her son, John Senior, who was accidentally killed while
in the employ of the defendant.••• [Po 956.] Lord Campbell C.J. now delivered the judgment of the Court. We are
of• opinion that the rule to enter the verdict in this case for
the defendant or to enter a nonsuit must be made absolute.
The authorities upon the subject are all collected and commented upon in The Bartollshill Coal Co. v. Reid (3 Macq.App.
Ca. 266). According to these authorities, the action would
not have been maintainable if the deceased had come to his
death purely from the negligence of his fellow servants employed in the same work with him. However, a strong case
of negligence on the part of the defendant, as contributing
to the death, has been made out; and, if an answer had not
been given to this case, by shewing negligence on the part
of the deceased which contributed to his death, we think the
defendant ought to have been held liable•••. [Po 957.]
We conceive that the Legislature, in passing the statute on
which this action is brought, intended to give an action to
the representatives of a person l~illed by negligence only
where, had he survived, he himself, at the common law, could
have maintained an action against the person guilty of the
alleged negligence. Under the circumstances of this case,
could the deceased, if he had survived, have maintained an
action against the defendant for what he suffered from the
accidentY We think that he could not: for, although the
negligence of the defendant might have been an answer to
the defence that the accident was chiefly caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, the negligence of the plaintiff himself, which materially contributed to the accident, would, upon
well established principles, have deprived him of any remedy.
Volenti non fit injuria.••• Judgment for the defendant."
To the same effect see Witherley v. The Regent's Canal AD.
(1862), 12 C.B.N.S. 2, 104 E.C.L. 2, 142 English Reprint
(Common Pleas Book 20) 1041, 1042.
[lIb] Thus the availability of contributory negligence as a
defense to wrongful death actions, brought under the statute
which appears to be the progenitor of the California act, was
firmly established when California acted. As hereinabove
indicated, it is to be presumed that such enactment was.
with knowledge of the English decisions pertinent to application of the law. (See llolmes v. McOolgan (1941),

supra, 17 Cal.2d 426, 430; Union Oil .4ssoc4atu

Y.
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(1935), supra, 2 Ca1.2d 727, 735; Estate of Potter (1922),
s'upra, 188 Cal. 55, 68; see also 82 C.J.S. 860-863, § 372, and
cases there cited.) Further examination of the California
legislation and of the decisions which followed it and its several amendments, explains, at least historically, the origin,
and demonstrates the establishment, of the pertinent rule in
this state.
Section 3 of the 1862 California statute provided that the
action should be brought in the name of the personal representative for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of
kin of the deceased, and that the jury could consider the
pecuniary injuries resulting to the widow and next of kin
and award both pecuniary and exemplary damages. Section 2
of the statute included the statement of a rule which would
now fit the definition of a presumption (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1959; see also, ide § 1961). It declared that "Whenever
the death of any person shall be caused by an injury received
in falling through, or by drowning after having fallen through,
any opening or defective place in any sidewalk, street, alley,
or wharf, in any city . . ., the death of such person shall
be deemed to have been caused by the wrongful neglect and
default of the person or persons . . • whose duty it was, at
the time . • . to have kept in repair such sidewalk, street,
alley, or wharf ••. "
In 1867 the court was called upon to apply the statute in
an action (Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal. 153) brought by a surviving ::ather, as the personal representative, to recover for the
death of his 5-year-old son, who was alleged to have drowned
after falling through a hole in the street and thence (p. 154)
"into the waters of the Bay of San Francisco beneath."
Defendants moved for a nonsuit on the ground, among others,
that the evidence affirmatively showed that plaintiff father
was himself contributively negligent in allowing the deceased
minor (p. 156) "to go alone about said street crossing, where
said hole was known to exist." Judgment of nonsuit was
granted, and on appeal by plaintiff the judgment was reversed. That the court considered that contributory negligence of the decedent (or of the plaintiff himself, if established) would constitute a bar to recovery is apparent from
its opinion. It specifically states that (p. 162) "How, far
the plaintiff was bound to go for the purpose of showing that
the death of his intestate was not attributable to his own
negligence, appears to be the principal question in the case. U
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After then referring to rules that deny recovery to plaintiff

in a personal injury action (p. 163) "if it appears that his
own negligence contributed in any degree to the injury which
he has sustained," it was stated that (pp. 163-164) "In a
gel1eral sense, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and
he must undoubtedly make a case, in view of which the jury
can say that they believe the injury was sustained through
the fault of the defendant, unaccompanied by any fault on
the part of the plaintiff,"2 but that such a rule is inadequate
where plaintiff (p. 164) "is wholly unable to make any proof
as to his own conduct," and in such event (p. 164) "the
jury are at liberty to infer ordinary care and diligence on
the part of the plaintiff from all the circumstances of the
ca:se-his character and habits and the natural instinct of
self preservation.••• If the plaintiff makes a case which does
not charge him with negligence we think his case should be
allowed to go to the jury. [Citations.] It should have been
left to the jury to say whether the plaintiff's intestate exercised ordinary care and diligence, under an instruction from
the Court that if he did not the plaintiff would not be entitled
to a verdict."
Although the discussion by the court, as above epitomized,
appears to refer indiscriminately to contributory negligence
by the deceased child as well as by the plaintiff father (i.e.,
the personal representative), the opinion clearly indicates
the views that (1) as a general rule a personal injury plaintiff
should (p. 164) "make a case which will leave him blameless"
(cf. May v. Hanson (1855), 5 Cal. 360, 365 [63 Am.Dec.
135], [" [I] t is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the
exercise by him of ordinary care to avoid the injury, but ..•
the proof of want of it on the part of the plaintiff, lies on
the defendant; ••• he who avers a fact in excuse of his own
misfeasance, must prove it"]), and (2) that if unable to
produce proof of his own or the decedent's conduct then he
is entitled to the benefit of an "inference" (more properly,
presumption) of care on his part and (p. 164) "If the plaintiff makes a case which does not charge him with negligence
we think his case should be allowed to go to the jury." It is
worthy of mention that the holding of the court concerning
the burden of proof in relation to contributory negligence
appears to have been reached without reliance on the positive
'The opinion in this case, 34 Cal. 153, 162·164, 8oDle~ u.eea the word

.4plaintiJI" as 81IlOD1Dloua with the dcceaaed..
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declaration of section 2 of the 1862 statute that the death of
a person caused by drowning after falling through a hole in
the street" shall be deemed to have been caused by the wrong·
ful neglect 71 of those whose duty it was to maintain the street
in repair.
In 1872 the 1862 statute was repealed and reenacted as
section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reading as follows:
"When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives
may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death; or when the death . . . is caused oy an injury
received in falling through any opening or defective place
in any sidewalk, street, alley, square, or wharf, his heirs or
personal representatives may maintain an action for damages
against the person whose duty it was, at the time of the injury,
to have kept in repair such sidewalk or other place. In every
such action the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or
exemplary, as, under all the circumstances of the case, may
to them seem just." Thus, the reenactment permitted the
action to be brought by the heirs as well as by the personal
representatives, deleted the language expressly requiring that
"the act, neglect, or default •.• [of the tort·fea.sor be] such
as would (if death had not ensu·ed) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof," and likewise deleted the positive direction that a
death caused by falling through a defective sidewalk, wharf,
or street, etc., "shall be deemed to have been caused by the
wrongful neglect" of those charged with the repair thereof.
Two years later (Code Amendments 1873.1874, p. 294) the
section was again amended; this time the reference to defective
sidewalks, wharves, streets, etc., was deleted from section 377,
the cause of action under that section was limited to the
wrongful death "of a person not being a minor," and actions
for the wrongful death of a minor were left for treatment
in section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It has been asserted (see 42 Cal.L.Rev. 310) that both Lord
Campbell '8 Act and the substantially similar 1862 California
statute "expressly provided that the cause of action should
only vest in the personal representative of the deceased, if
the deceased, had he survived, could have maintained an action
against the tortfeasor,"8 and in reliance upon Gay v. wtnter
"

)

-See also: Prosaer on Torts, p. 96i); 16 Am..J ur. 61, »82; Allnotatioll
A.L.B. 14.
.._~...
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(1867), snpra, 34 Cal. 153, that "Under this statute it is

necessary tltat the plaintiff provc, as a part of his case, not
only the negligence of the defendant but that tile deceased
was free from negligence contributing in any degree to the
i1}jury which resulted in his death. Thus the statute created
a cause of action in the personal representative only in those
cascs where the decedent did not, by his own negligence,
cOlltribute to the injury which resulted in his death."
However, as we have already noted, the statute is descriptive
only of the act of the tort feasor; it makes no reference whatsoever to the conduct of the decedent or to his ultimate right
to recover, as against a defense of contributory negligence,
if he had survived, and neither does the opinion in Gay v.
lVinter hold that the statute required a showing of decedent's
freedom from contributory negligence before a recovery could
be had. It follows that the further suggestion (42 Cal.L.
Rev. 311-313) that by omitting from the 1872 cnactment
of section 377 the provision which assertedly "made the decedent's freedom from negligence a condition upon the cause
of action which it created," the Legislature intended to remove
contributory negligence by the deceased as a bar to recovery
in a wrongful death action, is without merit. In the first
place, the Legislature had never by any language it used
"made the decedent's freedom from negligence a condition
upon the cause of action which it created," and Gay v. Winter
does not so hold. In the second place, if it had been the
intention of the Legislature to provide that contributory
negligence should not defeat recovery, then it could easily and
clearly have so stated, as has been done in section 3708 4 of
the Labor Code (see also Lab. Code, § 2801). Moreover, it
appears quite as likely that there was an intent, in view of
the discussion and holding in Gay v. Winter (1867), supra,
34 Cal. 153, 162-164, to (1) recognize contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery in defective street, etc., cases, notwithstanding the presumption theretofore positively declared, and
(2) more clearly accept contributory negligence as merely
defensive matter in all wrongful death cases, rather than to
·Section 3708: "In such action [against the uninsured employer] it is
presumed that the injury to the employee was a direct result and grew
out of the negligence of the employer, and the burden of proof is upon
the employer, to rebut the presumption of negligence. It is not a defense
to the employer that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence,
or assumed the risk of the hazard complained of, or that the injury was
caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. No contract or regulation
shall restore to the employer any of the fore~oin~ defenses."
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consider the negation thereof to be a part of plaintiff's case
in chief, whether it lay in his power to produce evidence
on the subject or otherwise.
[13] More important to ascertaining the established law
it appears indisputable that, regardless of whether we view
the origin of the contributory negligence rule in wrongful
death cases as being sound in law and reason or as being
~u~Htionable. in both, the rule itself has emerged as progenerate
III Its own rIght. From the time California's original wrongful death statute was enacted in 1862, presumptively in the
light of the English court decisions under Lord Campbell's
Act, hereinabove discussed, down to the present the California
cases have consistently and unswervingly followed the rule,
which likewise has been held to prevail, in the absence of
express statutory limitation, in most other jurisdictions, 5 that
contributory negligence on the part of the decedent bars recovery in wrongful death actions. (See e.g. of CaHfornia: Gay v.
Winter (1867), supra, 34 Cal. 153, 164; Glascock v. Central
Pac. R. Co. (1887), 73 Cal. 137, 141 [14 P. 518] ; Pepper v.
Southern Pac. Co. (1895), 105 Cal. 389, 399 r38 P. 974];
Studer v. Southern Pac. Co. (1898),121 Cal. 400 [53 P. 942,
66 Am.St.Rep. 39] ; Lemasters v. Southern Pac. Co. (1900),
131 Cal. 105, 107 [63 P. 128] ; Green v. Southern Cal. Ry.
Co. (1902), 138 Cal. 1, 2 [70 P. 926] ; Shade v. Bay Counties
.&

·See 17 Corpus Juris 1242 (and Supple'nents), note 54. for cases cited
as so holding from the following jurisdictions other than California:
United States, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iow~l. Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana.
Maine, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi.
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio. Pennsylvania, Porto Rico, Rhode Island. Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Cannda, British Columbia, Manitoha, N ova Scotia, Ontario, New·
foundland.
To the above list, Corpus Juris Secundum (25 C.J.S. 1140, 1141, ~ 46,
195!) Pocket Part) adds Nevada and South Dakota and American Jurisprudence. (16 Am.Jur. 88-89, ~ 130, notes 13 and 14) aods Idaho and
Oklahoma.
Corpus Juris Secundum states the rule thus: "In the absence of any
applicatory statute changing the rule, contributory negligence such as
would have barred an action by decedent is a good defense to an action
for his death." (25 C.J.S. 1140, ~ 46; see also eases cited under note 60.)
American Jurisprudence phrases the rule as follows: "In an action
for death wrongfully caused by ncglig<:>llce of the oefentlnllt, the !Wneral
rule is that negligence of the decedent proximately contributing to the
injury resulting in death harl! l'CC9very in favor of the beneficiaries for
the loss they have sustained thereby. This is true even where the death of
the deceased results from the violation by th!' defendant of a duty
imposed upon him by statutc where the statute pJ'es('nlJillg the duty uoes
not exclude such defense." (16 Am.Jur. 88·89, § 130.)

)
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Power 00. (1907), 152 Cal. 10, 13 [92 P. 62]; Young v.
Southern Pac. 00. (1920),182 Cal. 369, 375, 383 [190 P. 36J;
Read v. Pacific Elec. Ry. 00. (1921), 185 Cal. 520, 523 [197
P. 791J ; Oarroll v. Beavers (1954), 126 Cal.App.2d 828, 832
[273 P. 56] ; see also Dickmson v. SOll,thern Pac. 00. (1916),
172 Cal. 727 [158 P. 183] ; Orabbe v. Mammoth Ohannel G.
Min. 00. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [143 P. 714] ; 8 Cal.
Jur. 988-989, § 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the
fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796)
it was declared in Hedge v. lVilliams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [63
P. 721, 64 P. 106, 82 Am.St.Rep. 366], that if the death had
been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased,
then the heirs could not recover against the employer.
Meanwhile Code of Civil Procedure, section 377 (since the
enactment in 1872) has been amended three times. In 1901
(Stats. 1901, p. 126) a provision was added that if the person
causing the death "is employed by another who is responsible
for his conduct, then" the action could be maintained "also
against such other person." In 1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 460)
the section was extended to cover the wrongful death "of a
minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or
wife or child or children." By the next and most recent
amendment (Stats. 1949, ch. 1380, § 4) provision was made,
among other things, for survival of the action in case of death
of the tort feasor. At no time. however, has contributory
11egligence been abolished as a defense. [14] It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the
IJegislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing
domestic judicial decisions 6 and to have enacted and amended
statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing
upon them. (Estate of Oalhoun (1955), 44 Cal.2d 378, 384386 [282 P.2d 880] ; People v. Perkins (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 62,
63 [230 P.2d 353] ; McFadden v. Jordan (1948), 32 Cal.2d
330, 334 [196 P.2d 787]; Penaat v. Terwilliger (1944), 23
Ca1.2d 865, 871 [147 P.2d 552]; In re Halcomb (1942), 21
Ca1.2d 126, 129 [130 P.2d 384]; Whitley v. Superior Oourt
(1941), 18 Ca1.2d 75, 78 [113 P.2d 449] ; Miller v. McColgan
(1941), 17 Cal.2d 432, 439 [110 P.2d 419, 134 A.L.R. 1424] ;
Blodgett v. Supe1'ior Oom·t (1930),210 Cal. 1, 13 [290 P. 293,
72 A.L.R. 482] : Slocum v. Bear Valley lrr. 00. (1898), 122
-The rule all :tPl'!lt':ItOI'Y to tIll! dl'ci:;iolls of a foreign jurisdiction from
which 11 statute ia sulJstantially copied baa already been st.ated., ,v,PrG,
pp. 193·195.
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Cal. 555, 556 [55 P. 403, 68 Am.St.Rep. 68] ; see also 23 Cal.
Jur. 783, § 159; note, 2 D.C.L.A. Law Rev. 269, 271.)
[15] Under the circumstances which have been related it
must be recognized that until the Legislature sees fit to provide otherwise the rule is established in this state that in
wrongful death actions contributory negligence on the part
of the deceased is defensive matter and, when shown, will
bar recovery.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that they were erroneously prevented by the court from exercising their peremptory challenges in the selection of the jury. The settled statement
shows that prior to the trial and in chambers, the trial judge
informed counsel for both plaintiffs and defendant that the
practice in his department with respect to waiver of peremptory challenges is as follows: "That once an attorney
has waived any peremptory challenge to the jurors in the
box, that challenge is gone, so far as those jurors are concerned; that a peremptory can thereafter be exercised only
with respect to a juror or jurors called into the box after
the said waiver. They were also told that if either attorney
were dissatisfied with this method of handling peremptories
he, being advised in advance of what would happen, should,
if desiring to make a record, come to the bench and make
the record outside the hearing of the jurors, so that . . .
[such attorney] would not be embarrassed by having to challenge in the presence of the jurors someone sitting in the
box whom he knew would not be excused." The jury was
then selected in the following manner: After the jury box
was filled, plaintiffs exercised four peremptory challenges
alternately with the defendant and then passed a peremptory
challenge (plaintiffs' fifth) to the jurors then in the box.
Defendant then exercised a peremptory challenge to juror
No.9, and after a new venireman had entered the box plaintiffs in open court challenged juror No. 10, who had been
in the box at the time plaintiffs waived their fifth peremptory.
The court disallowed this challenge on the ground that the
juror had been in the box at the time plaintiff had passed
a peremptory and that their peremptory was now restricted
to the juror who had been caBed to fill the vacancy created
by defendant's last exercised peremptory challenge. T~e
court also reminded counsel of the conference in chambers
concerning the rule it then proposed to impose in respect to
the exercise of perelllptorl challenges. Thereupon the at tor-
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ney, by le~ve of court, further interrogated juror No. 10 as
to the effect upon him of the unsuccessful challenge and thereafter withdrew an exception he had taken to the court's ruling
and also expressly withdrew his challenge to No. 10. Later,
the attorneys went to the bench and plaintiffs' attorney protested that he had forgotten what the court had said in chambers and renewed his exception to the court's ruling on the
matter. Juror No. 10 remained on the jury throughout the
case.
Section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
" . . . Each side is entitled to six peremptory challenges.
If no peremptory challenges are taken until the panel is full,
they must be taken or passed by the sides alternately, commencing with the plaintiff, and -if both sides pass consecutively,
the jury shall then be sworn, unless the court, for good cause,
shall otherwise order. Each side shall be entitled to have
the panel full before exercising any peremptory challenge.
The 'I.umber of peremptory challenges remaining with a side
shalt ',lot be diminished by any passing of a peremptory challenge. H The portions in italics were added in 1953 (Stats.
1953, ch. 1578, § 1), after the trial of the instant case.
That plaintiffs were entitled to exercise the peremptory
challenge which they sought, is clear.
[16] The broad
power of a judge to control the proceedings before him
does not go so far as to warrant an exaction contrary to law.
[17] As declared in Silcox v. Lang (1889). 78 Cal. 118.
123-124 [20 P. 297], "The right to challenge a certain numbt>r
of jurors peremptorily is absolute under the statute. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 601.) The fact that the appellant had once
passed the jury, including the juror afterward sought to be
challenged, did not cut off this right. The proper practice
in the selection of a jury in a civil case is to fill the panel,
and upon one of the jurors being challenged for any cause,
or 'without cause,' to immediately call another to take his
place, so that a party, in dt>termining whether to challenge
or not, may do so with a full panel before him. [Citations.j"
(See also Taylor v. 'Western Pac. R. Co. (1873), 45 Cal. 323,
329-332.) Nothing to the contrary appears in Vance v. R1chardson (1895), 110 Cal. 414 r42 P. 909], where. when the
pane] was full, defendant-appellant waived" our peremptory
for the present," and counsp] for plaintiff then stated "I am
satisfied with the jury." rrhere was in the Vance case uo
substitution of a new juror for one challenged by respondent.
such as occuncd in Silco.c v. Lana u.s well as in the case now
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before us. Vallejo etc. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. (1915),
169 Cal. 545, 559 [147 P. 238], is not here material, as it
appears to merely hold that nO" error occurred when the
court permitted plaintiff-respondent to H exercise its remaining peremptory challenge after the panel was filled and all
the jurors had been examined and passed for cause by both
parties." (C/. Austin v. Lambert (1938),11 Ca1.2d 73, 79-80
[77 P.2d 849, 115 A.L.R. 849].)
[18] However, here as in People v. Estorga (1928), 206
Cal. 81, 87 [273 P. 575] (see also People v. Hickman (1928),
204 Cal. 470, 481 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117]), the appellant
"has made no affirmative showing, and does not offer to show,
that any of the ••. jurors who were actually sworn and
served in the trial of the cause were biased, prejudiced, or
in any way unfit to serve as trial jurors; nor does it appear
that by reason of the manner in which the jury was selected
the •.• [appellantJ did not have a fair and impartial trial."
Under such circumstances, and although the method by which
the jury was selected was erroneous and cannot be approved
by this court, the error nevertheless does not appear on the
record before us, which is epitomized on pages 186-188, supra,
and which also establishes that the jurors were polled and were
unanimous in their verdict, to have resulted in a miscarriage
of justice, and hence furnishes no ground for reversal of the
judgment. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; see also People v.
Hoyt (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29J; Jackson v.
Superior Court (1937), 10 Ca1.2d 350, 358 [74 P.2d 243, 113
A.L.R. 1422] ; Switzler v. Atchison etc. By. Co. (1930), 104
Cal.App. 138, 151 [285 P. 918J ; People v. Bambaud (1926),
78 Cal.App. 685, 692 [248 P. 954].)
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
TRA YNOR J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the conclusion and reasoning of the majority opinion that
contributory negligence is a defense in a wrongful death
action, but I agree with Justice Carter that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in denying plaintiffs their statutory right to a peremptory challenge. For that reason .r
would reverse the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agl'ee with the reasoning of the majority that the
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contributory negligence of a decedent either should, or must,
be imputed to the heirs of said decedent in a wrongful death
action.
The cause of action for wrongful death is wholly statutory;
it is entirely separate and distinct from any cause of action
which the decedent (had he lived) might have had (Bo-nd v.
United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270 [113 P. 366, Ann. Cas. 19120
50, 48 L.R.A.N.S. 687]; McLaughlin v. United Railroads,
169 Cal. 494 [147 P. 149, Ann.Cas. 1916D 337, L.R.A. 1915E
1205] ; Olark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527 [150 P. 357, L.R.A.
1916A 1142]).
The majority opinion, speaking of the three amendments
to section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that " At
no time, however, has contributory negligence been abolished
as a defense." Contributory negligence was never specifically
mentioned by the section as a defense-although the appellate
courts assumed that contributory negligence on the part of
the decedent would bar recovery by his heirs or personal
representative. The language in the original enactment which
could have been said to imply that the decedent's contributory
negligence was a defense to an action brought by the personal
representative was deleted when section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was enacted giving to the heirs also the right
to sue. Judge Paul Nourse (42 Cal.L.Rev. 310 et seq.) points
out that "Upon the grounds that the cause of action for
wrongful death is a new cause of action and separate and
distinct from any cause of action that the deceased might
have had, it has been uniformly held that the admissions of
the decedent against his interests and which might tend to
establish his negligellce, are not admissible against his heirs
in an action brought under Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure [Hedge v. Will'iams, 131 Cal. 455 [63 P. 721, 64
P. 106, 82 Am.St.Rep. 366]; Marks v. Reissinger, 35 Cal.
App. 44, 54 [169 P. 243]]. It seems anomalous to hold that
the negligence of the decedent will defeat a cause of action
for his death, and to hold that his own admissions may not
be used as proof of his negligence.
"The Legislature not having made the decedent's freedom
from negligence a condition upon the cause of action which
it created, the Courts are without power to graft such conditions upon that cause of action. To do so would be to amend
the statute by judicial decree. [Cal. Const., art. III, § 1 ;
AUen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184 [30 P. 213, 16 L.R.A. 646] ; Moore
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v. United States P. & O. 00., 122 Cal.App. 205 [9 P.2d 562] ;
Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611, 615 [204 P. 237].]"
Section 1714 of the Civil Code"is the section which contains
the defense of contributory negligence. That section provides
that "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
wilful acts but also for injuries occasioned to another by his
want of ordinary care or skill ..• except so far as the latter
has, wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injuries
upon himself. ••. " (Emphasis added.) Judge Nourse notes
that "It is clear that there is nothing in the section which
allows one, who through negligence has injured another, to
escape liability because someone other than the person injured
by his negligence contributed to that injury. Yet this is what
occurs when a defendant tortfeasor is permitted to plead the
negligence of the decedent in an action for wrongful death
founded upon Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
is the heirs of the decedent who have suffered pecuniary loss,
who are the persons injured by the act of the tortfeasor.
Certainly it cannot be said that the widow and minor children
of a man killed by the negligence of another have, in the
words of Section 1714, 'wilfully or by want of ordinary care
brought the injuries' upon themselves." (Emphasis added.)
Judge Nourse notes that the reasons given for the defense
of contributory negligence in the decided cases have no application to an action for wrongful death. Quoting from PujiS8
v. Los Angeles Ry. 00., 12 Cal.App. 207, 211 [107 P. 317],
it appears that "In order that contributory negligence shall
prevent the recovery of damages for a personal injury, it must
appear that the negligence is that of the injured person or
of someone over whom he exercised some control. . . . The
reason for the rule which so relieves the defendant from the
payment of damages for his negligence where the plaintiff has
contributed to the injury by his own negligence, as it is
applied in this state, is based upon an argument of convenience, to wit, the impossibility of successfully apportioning the damages between the parties, and not for the reason
that the law relieves the defendant from responsibility merely
because the injured party has contributed to the result by
his own negligence or wrongful act."
Judge Nourse points out that in an action for wrongful
death the plaintiffs have brought no injury upon themselves.
The fact that the person, whose death gives rise to their cause
of action, has by his own negligence, in some degree "however
slight" contributed to his own death, is, under the language

....
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of the court just quoted, or under the provisions of section
1714 of the Civil Code of no more moment than the contributing negligence of some third person.
An additional distinction between the ordinary tort action
apd a wrongful death action are the damages recoverable:
In the ordinary personal injury action, the plaintiff recovers
for medical expenses, pain or suffering. together with compensatory damages; in a wrongful death action, the heirs may
recover damages for the injuries they have sustained: loss of
support, society, comfort and protection.
Judge Nourse "submits" that the basis for the defense of
contributory negligence is entirely lacking in an action for
wrongful death even though the cases dealing with actions
under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure have held
that contributory negligence was a defense. He says that if
the cases are wrong, this court should not hesitate to overrule
them.
I agree with the logic and reasoning set forth by Judge
Nourse; I feel that the cases holding contributory negligence
a defense in wrongful death actions are wrong and should be
overruled and that the error should not be perpetuated as is
being done in the instant case.
I also disagree with the majority in its holding that the
failure of the trial court to obey the clear mandate of section
601 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not prejudicial error.
The evidence was in sharp conflict concerning the person
responsible for the negligence which caused the death of plaintiffs' decedent. The jury returned a defendants' verdict.
We are told by the majority that plaintiffs made no "affirmative showing" that any of the jurors were biased, prejudiced,
or unfit to serve as jurors. As a matter of fact, it would be
impossible to tell the effect the juror in querrtion had on the
adverse verdict returned by the jury. It was also impossible
for the plaintiffs to show "affirmatively" that the juror in
question contributed to the loss of the case. The problem
involved here does not fall under the provisions of section 657,
subdivision 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and even if
plaintiffs had produced jurors' affidavits of bias or prejudice
on the part of the challenged juror it woold have availed
them nothing.
It is well settled that affidavits or evidence of any character concerning the mental attitude of either concurring or
dissenting jurors which tend to contradict, impeach or defeat
their verdict are inadmissible. (Murphy v. Go'unty of Lake.
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106 Cal.App.2d 61 [234 P.2d 712] ; Barrett v. Oity of Olaremont, 41 Ca1.2d 70 l256 P.2d 977J; Marino v. Oounty of
Tuolumne, 118 Cal.App.2d 6751258 P.2d 540] ; Anderson v.
Oounty of San Joaquin, 110 Cal.App.2d 703 [244 P.2d 75].)
Even affidavits or testimony of third persons offered to prove
admissions of jurors to impeach the verdict are not countenanced. (Noble v. Key System, Ltd., 10 Cal.App.2d 132
[51 P.2d 887].) In fact, the authorities are uniform to the
effect that affidavits or oral evidence of either concurring or
dissenting jurors may not be received to contradict, impeach
or defeat their verdict, except to show that the verdict was
secured by chance. (Orabtree v. Western Pac. R. 00.,33 Cal.
App.2d 35 [90 P.2d 835] ; Johnson v. Gray, 4 Cal.App.2d 72
[40 P.2d 575] ; Toomes v. Nunes, 24 Cal.App.2d 395 [75 P.2d
94] ; Phipps v. Patters01l, 27 Cal.App.2d 545 [81 P.2d 437] ;
Gray v. Robinson, 33 Cal.App.2d 177 [91 P.2d 194].)
In view of the settled law of this state as announced in
the foregoing authoriites it is difficult for me to devise a
means or method whereby appellant could have made a showing of prejudice to his case as the result of the admittedly
erroneous ruling of the trial court against him. The record
discloses that he was denied his statutory right to the exercise
of a peremptory challenge. This the majority concedes. The
verdict of the jury was against him notwithstanding the
conceded fact that the evidence was sufficient to support a
verdict in his favor. Since it was not possible under the rules
of law above announced for appellant to have made a showing
as to what took place in the jury room or of the state of mind
of the juror he sought to challenge, it is obvious that there
is no basis in law or fact for the statement of the majority
that appellant was required to make an affirmative showing
that he was prejudiced as the result of the error committed
by the trial court in denying appellant his statutory right
to exercise the peremptory challenge here in question in order
to obtain a reversal of the judgment.
In view of the foregoing it is obvious that the approach
of the majority to the problem here involved is wholly unrealistic. If the majority is right in this case, then a trial
judge may announce at the beginning of the trial or at any
time during the trial that neither party may exercise any
peremptory challenge, and although an exception is taken to
the ruUng and either or both parties seek to impose peremptory
challenges and are denied the right to do so by the court,
this court could hold that since there is no showing of preju-
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dice by the party against whom the verdict was rendered, a
judgment r('ndered thereon must be affirmed, thus abrogating
the statutes which allow peremptory challenges to jurors as
a matter of right in both civil and criminal cases. I have
np doubt that every trial lawyer will be shocked to learn
that such is the law of this state.
None of the authorities cited in the majority opinion supports the view expressed therein on this point. In none of
those cases was a party denied the right to exercise a peremptory challenge where he admittedly had the right to impose
Buch challenge as in the case at bar. It is true that there is
Bome loose language in some of those cases to the effect that
where a party challenges the ruling of the trial court with
respect to the qualifications of a juror, he must make an
affirmative showing that the ruling of the trial court was
prejudicial to him, but this is a far cry from holding that
where the trial court arbitrarily denies a party the statutory
right to exercise a peremptory challenge, he must in some
manner not disclosed by the majority opinion here nor in any
of the authorities cited, make an affirmative showing of prejudice in order to obtain a reversal of a judgment entered upon
a verdict adverse to the party denied such right.
Because of the prejudicial error committed by the trial
court in denying plaintiffs their statutory right to a peremptory challenge and because I firmly believe that contributory negligence is not, nor should it be, a defense in a
wrongful death action, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 4,
1955. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted, and Carter, J., filed the following opinion:
CARTER, J .-The majority of this court has modified its
opinion and denied a rehearing in this case notwithstanding
the fact that the petition for rehearing pointed out that never
before has an appellate court in this state held that the denial
of the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is a mere error
in procedure which may bc cured by the application of
section 4% of article VI of the Constitution of California and
that numerous cases holding to the contrary were not even
mentioned in the majority opinion. As counsel for appellant
point out in their petition for rehearing there is a long and
unbroken line of well considered opinions of this court and the
Dis~ct Courts of Appeal holding squarely that the right te
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challenge peremptorily is absolute, and not qualified by the
necessity of showing injury. This rule was reannounced as
late as July 27th, 1951 in the Mse of People v. Diaz, 105 Cal.
App.2d 690, 696 [234 P.2d 300] (hearing denied by this
court without dissenting vote) where the District Court of
Appeal said: "The denial of the right of peremptory challenge cannot be said to be a mere matter of procedure. The
right is absolute. (People v. Helm, 152 Cal. 532, 535 [93
P. 99].) It is a substantial right. It has been said that
it is one of the chief safeguards of a defendant against an
unlawful conviction and that the courts ought to permit
its freest exercise within the limitation fixed by the Legislature. (People v. Edwards, 101 Cal. 543, 544 [36 P. 7].)
As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U. S. 68 [7 8.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578, 580],
experience has shown that one of the most effective means to
free the jury box from persons unfit to be there is the exercise
of the peremptory challenge. The right may not be abridged
or denied. Arbitrary abridgment or denial of the right runs
counter to principles vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of a constitutional right of trial by jury."
(Emphasis added.)
Numerous other decisions, quoted in the decisions cited in
People v. Diaz, supra, reiterate as a constitutional dogma that
nnder our jury system, the right to peremptory challenge is
absolute and an "inseparable and inalienable part of the right
of trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution."
The majority of the court has recognized this principle in
theory, but has just as effectively denied it in practice.
Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [273
P. 575], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [268 P. 909, 270
P. 1117], this court has qualified the right and requires an
"affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. In neither of the
above cited cases was a party deprived of a peremptory challenge. These two cases can therefore be no authority or
precedent for the holding of this court.
In applying the provision of section 4%, article VI, of
the California Constitution, which applies to procedural defects, and not to errors of substantive law, this court has
in effect overruled a number of precedents of this. court
holding directly to the contrary, that the provisions of section
41;2, article VI, California Constitution, do not apply where
the right to peremptory challenge has been abridged.
In People v. Oarmichael, 198 Cal. 534 [246 P. 62], the
)
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court, referring to article VI, section 41;2 of the Constitution,
declared, page 5·17: "It was never intended by this provision
of the constitution to take from the defendant in a criminal
action his fundamental right to a jury trial or in any substaptial manner to abridge this right. (People v. Wismer,
58 Cal.App. 679, 688 [209 P. 259])."
In People v. lVismer, 58 CaLl\.pp. 679 [209 P. 259], after
the defendant had exercised all of his peremptory challenges,
he was compelled to accept a juror who was disqualified by
reason of actual bias. The court held, page 687: "Section
4% of article VI of the constitution has no application to the
situation presented here. The right of trial by jury is fundamental-a right which came to us from the common law and
as such guaranteed by the constitution-and inseparably connected therewith (indeed, it is of the very essence thereof)
is the right to a trial by a jury consisting of unbiased and
unprejudiced persons.'J
In People v. Bennett, 79 Cal.App. 76, the court stated, page
91 [249 P. 20]: "And it should always be remembered that,
in the trial of a criminal case, any act or action of a trial
court which must necessarily have the effect of denying to the
accused a trial by a fair and impartial jury will not be
excused or mitigated by the terms of section 4% of article
VI of the constitution. The right of trial by jury is fundamental."
In People v. O'Oonnor, 81 Cal.App. 506 [254 P. 630], the
defendant was denied the right to exercise the number of
peremptory challenges to which he was entitlpd under the
statute. It was contended that section 4V2 of article VI
applied. The court said, page 520: "As generally defined
'procedure' includes in its meaning whatever is embraced
by the three technical terms, pleading, evidence, and practice.
(32 Cyc. 405.) Had there been no denial of the exercise
of any peremptory challenges, we seriously question whether
t.his section has any application to the cause before us. This
section must refer to pleading and procedure, as authorized
by the codes. Thus, to make it applicable to the pleadings.
had there been any defects ill the informations not affecting
the substantial rights of the parties, as accorded by law, then,
and in that case, the error should be held harmless. Likewise,
if the court omitted to follow the procedure embodied by the
codes for the arraignment and trial of the defendants upon
the informations filed against them and had committed some
error in so doing, which did not affect the substantial rights
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of the parties, then such error in procedure would likewise
be held harmless, but, it cannot reasonably be helcl that section
41/2 of ari1'cle VI is so broad i1l its meaning as to permit the
trial court to disregard the usual and ordinary p"ocedu,+e in
the trial of a cause and adopt a new and entirely different
manner fron/, that recognized by law. Such a course is not a
mistake in procedure" it is a substitution of procedure. 'What
would excuse a mistake in procedure would not and could
'not be held to allow the creation of a course unprovided for
by law. JHstake is one thing j a substitution is an e'ntirely
a'ifferent thing." (Emphasis added.)
It is abundantly clear from the above cited authorities that
section 4% of article VI, since it relates to procedure, has no
application where the right to peremptory challenge has been
interfered with. Yet, the majority here, without citation of
authority in support of its position holds that simply because
"the jurors were polled and were unanimous in their verdict"
the error in denying appellant his right to exercise a peremptory challenge was cured by section 4% of article VI of the
Constitution. The majority arrives at this conclusion even
though it concedes that the evidence produced on behalf of
appellant was amply sufficient to support a verdict and judgment in his favor.
There can be no question whatsoever that, so far as appears
from the face of the majority opinion, the conclusion that
no miscarriage of justice resulted was not based on a review
of all of the evidence in the case but solely on the ground
that there was no affirmative showing that any juror who
served was biased or otherwise unfit. Of course, it is obvious
from a consideration of the authorities cited in my dissenting
opinion heretofore filed in this case that such a showing would
be virtually impossible in view of the law relating to the
unimpeachability of verdicts. But the majority does not
attempt to meet this argument, but blindly invokes the provisions of section 4% of article VI of the Constitution because
the jury was unanimous in its verdict in favor of defendant.
In so holding, it is obvious that the majority do not appreciate the significance of the right to a peremptory challenge.
This challenge has always existed in our law and has a very
salutary purpose. It enables the litigant to remove from the
jury box a prospective juror who has failed to discloS'e his
true mental state and who may possess deep seated prejudices
against the litigant or his case which the prospective juror
will not admit on voir dire examination. The right to remove
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such a prospective juror, without disclosing the reason therefor, is a basic fundamental right guaranteed by the statutes
of this state and is known and recognized by all trial lawyers
to be one of the most important safeguards against the selection of those for jury duty who are disqualified because they
possess a state of mind adverse to the party exercising the
challenge which cannot be disclosed by voir dire examination.
'fhe assumption of the majority that one prejudiced juror
could not bring about a unanimous verdict against a party
in the face of satisfactory evidence in his favor when he has
been denied the right to challenge the prejudiced juror, is not
borne out by either theory or practical experience. Those who
have had experience in the trial of jury cases appreciate the
importance of eliminating from juries those who have preconceived notions as to what result should be reached regardless of the evidence, and many tales have been told and more
remain untold of how one or two overzealous jurors have
brought about a verdict against the weight of the evidence.
In this connection I cannot refrain from repeating the warning I so often heard from my venerable father that one rotten
apple will spoil the whole barrel. While this was applied to
an occasional bad boy in the community, it is just as applicable
to jurors or other small groups.
It is traditional in our judicial system tbat the jury selected
to try a case should be fair and impartial. 'fhe Legislature
has endeavored to prescribe a system for the selection of
juries which will as nearly as possible guarantee to litigants
a jury composed of fair and impartial persons. This court
has helJ unanimously ill this case that the system provided
by the Legislature for the selection of juries was not followed
in this case. That there was a substantial departure from the
system so prescribed there can be no question. Such being
the case, the plaintiff was not accorded the type of jury trial
guaranteed by the laws of this state. The majority concedC1l
that this was error. There is only one way to cure this error
and that is to grant plaintiff a new trial. To do otherwise is
to deny to plaintiff the equal and exact justice to which he is
entitled, by the verdict of a jury impartially selected, which
Thomas Jefferson declared to be one of the principles which
"form the bright cOllstella tion which has Gone be£Ol'e us."
(First Inaugural Addr~, March 4, 1S01.)

